For many reasons, payment systems are subject to strong network effects; one of those is the necessity of interoperability among participants. This is often accomplished via standardsetting organizations. The goal of the Single European Payments Area (SEPA) is to establish modern cross-boarder consumer payment systems for Europe. This too will require a standard-setting arrangement. But patents are also becoming an important feature of electronic payment systems and thus standard setting under SEPA should incorporate a policy to address the ownership and licensing of essential intellectual property. Using examples from the experience of European mobile telephony and financial patenting in the United States, we argue that the lack of a well-developed IP policy creates significant risks for participants in the new SEPA payment systems.
Introduction
Intellectual property is widely regarded as the main policy tool of modern societies for molding private incentives to innovate and to diffuse innovations.
1 Alan Greenspan has frequently (e.g., April 3, 2003, and February 27, 2004 ) pondered the question: "If our objective is to maximize economic growth, are we striking the right balance in our protection of intellectual property rights?" This is a difficult question for economists to answer in general. It is especially difficult to address this question in the context of financial services, including payment systems.
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One special feature of financial services is that, until recently, patents have only rarely been used to protect financial innovations as such (Tufano 2003, Frankel and White 2004) . In most other industries patents are common, providing their owners with strong and relatively broad protection of their technological innovations. But in the United States, at least, financial patents became commonplace after the landmark 1998 decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group. 3 This decision made it clear that computerimplemented methods of doing business, including those involving finance, were indeed patentable subject matter (Hunt 2001 , Lerner 2002 ).
The use of formal intellectual property rights to protect financial innovations is more limited in Europe than in the U.S. But most contemporary financial services rely on information technology. Unlike business methods per se, there is no doubt about the patentability of such technology. 4 Indeed, the information and communication technology 1 We use the term intellectual property generically. The issues raised are relevant to patents and other industrial rights, such as utility models and protection of topographies of semiconductor products. Sometimes, they also have a bearing on copyright and related rights, especially database rights. In contrast, trademarks, which differ in function and purpose, are not discussed.
2 See Hunt (2007) for a discussion of the measurement problem in the context of financial services in the U.S. (ICT) industries (e.g., computers, communications, and electronics) are some of the most patent-intensive sectors of the economy (Bessen and Hunt 2007) .
Intellectual property has already found its way to the European financial services sector in recent years, and it is likely to become ubiquitous in the future. Today, its role is often underappreciated by the management of financial companies and the staff of the government agencies that regulate them. In this paper we argue that intellectual property is now an important facet of any effort in standard setting in financial services. Indeed, disputes over intellectual property pose a risk to the development of the Single European Payments Area (SEPA) and subsequent innovations in banking and retail payment media in Europe.
This risk should be evaluated and carefully managed.
SEPA is a major public policy initiative to standardize non-cash payment methods in the euro area (see, e.g., England 2006, and Kemppainen and Salo 2006) . 5 The payments industry is a network industry, and, as such, it entails very large gains associated with standardization. Without standardization, many of the potential consumer benefits from the creation of the euro will not be realized. These benefits include, among other things, lower transactions costs, faster settlement, reduced risk, more transparency, and increased price competition. As part of the development of the European payment systems, a new Directive on Payment Services (PSD) is currently being prepared in the EU for providing a modern and comprehensive set of rules applicable to all electronic payment services in the European Union and the necessary legal platform for SEPA.
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A conservative estimate of the direct cost savings achieved under full implementation of SEPA exceeds €20 billion a year (European Commission, 2006) . Two important sources of cost savings include the scale economies that can be attained by consolidating payment networks that currently operate at the national level and the substitution of electronic payments for paper transactions as the differences in their relative cost and convenience increase (Bolt and Humphrey 2007) . But obtaining these benefits will require substantial investment. The cost to banks of implementing SEPA over its first five years is estimated to be in the range of €5-10 billion (Schmiedel 2007 ).
The intersection of standard setting and intellectual property rights is complicated and sometimes contentious. There is almost an inherent tension between the two: the goal of intellectual property is to stimulate the incentive to innovate by giving its owner a right to exclude others from using the innovation, whereas the goal of standardization is to stimulate the use of innovations adopted as a standard. Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) must negotiate a compromise that is reasonably attractive for each of these constituencies. This is not always an easy task, as a number of scholars have recently documented (Shapiro 2001 , Lemley 2002 , and Chiao et al. 2006 . It is particularly difficult for industries where interoperability standards are required to make products or services compatible with each other in order to maximize the benefits of network externalities. It is further complicated by the potential for opportunistic behavior by participants who own patents on a technology essential to the standard. There is a risk that without sufficient transparency and sufficiently strong mutual interests, network participants could make large investments to implement a standard only to be held up by a firm threatening to withhold a key piece of technology. In all likelihood some kind of agreement would be reached, but on terms substantially worse than the participants initially expected. Indeed, the risk of such an outcome may discourage firms from adopting a standard or even participating in the standard-setting process. In other instances, awareness of a key blocking patent might lead to the adoption of a standard that poses less risk to participants but which is also technologically inferior.
These externalities can also work in the opposite direction. If a financial standardsetting organization is sufficiently influential in coordinating the decisions of its member financial institutions and is able to require the sharing of technology at concessionary prices, the incentive to invest in these technologies could be significantly impaired. While financial institutions would be able to adopt a standard, the underlying technology would again be inferior when compared to a regime that offers better incentives for developers of new technologies.
Often SSOs have specific policies designed to mitigate these risks. But designing these policies and obtaining the acceptance of the relevant participants can be challenging. A
well-designed IP policy should simultaneously provide incentives for firms to participate in the standard-setting process and encourage new innovations that would eventually lead to a better standard. The policy should also specify the rights enjoyed by owners of the relevant intellectual property and the licensing terms to be used. Often, these policies call for "reasonable" royalties and access to the key technologies for all participants (e.g., open or non-discriminatory licensing). 7 Of course, these terms must be acceptable to owners of the intellectual property, since their participation in a standard is typically voluntary. The difficulties in establishing a successful IP policy for a standard should not be discounted.
There are numerous historical examples of licensing disputes and allegations of holdups related to standards (see, e.g., Bekkers et al. 2002 , Blind et al. 2002 , and Lemley 2002 .
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By one estimate, patents covering an industry standard are 13 times more likely to be litigated than other U.S. patents (Lemley 2007 ). This experience is relevant to the case of standard setting in financial services and to electronic payments in particular.
7 In addition, a binding policy could, for example, stipulate that while a patent owner retains the right to obtain royalties, it has, under a binding contract, committed to forgo injunctive remedies or treble damages under patent law (Lemley 2007) . Such terms would significantly reduce risks for the users of the patented technology, but they may not be acceptable to owners of that technology.
An additional complicating factor for SEPA is that legal treatment of financial innovations is evolving. In addition, modern payment systems rely extensively on ICT. The ownership of the relevant intellectual property is spread over many companies located in many countries. As result, there can be considerable variation in the IP strategies of these firms, which are influenced, in turn, by the historical and legal traditions of their home countries.
Each of these factors suggests that the development of SEPA should include a wellarticulated IP policy. This is especially important given SEPA's objective of "creating open and common standards that overcome technical and commercial barriers" for cashless payment services within the euro area. All electronic payments should "migrate to common interoperable formats and processes." SEPA should also be a "forward-looking" process, "both embracing and enabling the realisation of new technological opportunities."
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first review the law and economics of intellectual property in financial services and standard setting (Section 2). Our definition of financial innovation is broad, including technological innovations that facilitate financial services. We point out that such innovations are patentable in Europe and can also sometimes be protected through copyright and database rights. Based on the literature we explain why a well-defined intellectual property policy is a key to successful standard setting in network industries.
In Section 3 we present some examples from the communications industry where IP disputes have jeopardized some standards, despite rigorous efforts to avoid them. We think the experience of the communications industry is relevant for payment media, and we explain why: despite differences in the underlying technologies, the legal and economic problems are almost identical. We also point to the pattern of financial patenting and litigation in the U.S.
In Section 4 we argue that the lack of a proper intellectual property policy may seriously hamper adoption of the new SEPA payment instruments and subsequent innovation in the European payment media industry. In particular, it seems likely that some patents encompassing future standards in SEPA payment methods will be owned by third-party suppliers rather than by European financial participants. This could make standardization more complex and increase the risk of hold-up problems. Concluding remarks and policy recommendations are collected in Section 5.
The Law and Economics of Intellectual Property in Financial Services and in

Standard-Setting Organizations
Intellectual Property and Innovations in Financial Services
It is widely believed that innovations in the European financial services industry are protected primarily by copyrights and trade secrets. The definition of financial innovation is often interpreted narrowly to encompass new financial market instruments or structures, such as collateralized debt obligations or hedge funds (see, e.g., Tufano, 2003) . Financial formulas and methods are thought to be beyond the scope of patentable subject matter in Europe.
Indeed, Article 52 of the European Patent Convention is typically interpreted to prohibit patents on methods of doing business, including financial ones, as such. This stands in contrast to the practice observed not only in the U.S. (Hunt 2001 (Hunt , 2007 property is likely to influence the design and implementation of SEPA standards and it would be best to take this into account early in the planning stages.
The Impact of Interoperability Standards in Network Industries
It has been recognized at least since the seminal article by Katz and Shapiro (1985) (as soon as one emerges) and most competing solutions disappear from the market. For example, Microsoft's operating system emerged as a de facto standard in the 1990s. IBM abandoned its competing operating system, and the market share of Apple Computers fell precipitously. Apple was able to recover only when it made its operating system more compatible with applications designed for the Microsoft operating system.
When a firm's technology becomes a de facto standard, it often obtains a dominant position in the industry and may enjoy supra-normal profits. 14 In addition, the firm may enjoy significant influence over the technological development in the market, and this may in turn lead to significant strategic advantages. 15 Of course, competition law can, and is, used to address questions about exercises of market power by the owners of a de facto standard.
Formal, i.e., de jure, standardization usually occurs when there is a perceived market failure that is preventing the emergence of a de facto standard (Blind et al. 2002) . Although governments sometimes establish de jure interoperability standards, it is uncommon for these to be compulsory. Again, the market tipping effect for network industries typically makes such coercion unnecessary. But we will examine one counter-example -the mandatory technical standard for the global system for mobile communications (GSM) -later in this paper.
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The European Commission examined the question of mandatory standards in the early 1990s and recommended that they reflect a consensus based on the views of all interested
parties and that such standards should be available to all interested parties subject to the mandatory obligations (European Commission 1992). In short, the commission strongly recommended the use of formalized standard setting in which all relevant parties could participate and an intellectual property policy that would ensure open access to the standard.
Today, mandatory standards within the European Union framework are often used as common reference standards.
"Standard setting" is by definition a domain of de jure standardization, where a standard is explicitly specified by an SSO or among a group of market participants. Since the SEPA initiative is an example of de jure standardization, we focus on de jure standardization and especially on the challenges SSOs encounter. The standards developed under SEPA also fall into the category of mandatory technical standards (like GSM), since participation in the common market for the payment industry will require compliance with the standards developed under SEPA. These distinctions may be important when thinking about the role of intellectual property in the SEPA process.
2.3The Role of Intellectual Property in Standard Setting
While there is a tension between standardization and intellectual property, designing optimal intellectual property laws and standard-setting policies involves common objectives.
Economic theory suggests that an optimal intellectual property law strikes a balance between the interests of inventors and creators on the one hand and the interests of consumers and 16 The technical standard was mandatory in the sense that licenses for the radio frequencies used by the mobile other users of innovations on the other hand (Nordhaus 1969) . Similarly, the optimal standard-setting policy must balance the interests of innovators and users. In other words, a good intellectual property law and standard-setting policy both try to promote the use of innovations without stifling the incentive to make them in the first place.
Several factors explain the interaction between property rights and standard setting.
First, intellectual property typically gives its owner an exclusive right to determine how it will be used. An SSO developing a standard that will rely on a patented technology must obtain the consent of the patent holder on terms that are agreeable to the likely users of the standard. In the process, the SSO may create substantial network effects that significantly increase the value of the patented technology, at least relative to an environment where no standard exists. 17 The question then is, who captures these benefits: the owners or the users of the technology and in what proportions?
Second, standard setting is designed to coordinate the adoption of particular technological solutions or processes. As a result, it tends to restrict the paths for future technological development and thus tends to concentrate the R&D efforts of active participants. Thus, over time, standardization is likely to increase the degree of technological overlap between firms. At the same time, so long as many firms remain active in their R&D, there can be a tendency for increased fragmentation of intellectual property rights (Rahnasto 2003 , Ziedonis 2004 , Kultti et al. 2006 ). This fragmentation of intellectual property rights, in turn, can complicate the implementation of better standards in the future.
Third, the standard-setting process is time-consuming and involves decisions subject to uncertainty and asymmetric information. It typically takes a long time to develop the consensus necessary to make the standard a commercial success. Some participants may have networks were conditioned on the requirement that equipment using those frequencies must be compliant.
private information about the efficacy of a particular solution and the current or future owners of the relevant technology are not always known. These characteristics of the standard-setting environment create at least the potential for strategic behavior for both users and owners of potentially relevant technologies. They also complicate the design of contracts or rules to prevent such behavior.
For example, disclosing a pending patent application for a technology being contemplated for a standard may not be in the strategic interest of the firm seeking the patent.
Other firms may anticipate the outcome of the standard-setting process and apply for patents that would be infringed by users conforming to the standard. 18 With incomplete disclosure of pending applications, technology users may underestimate the costs of complying with the standard, increasing the likelihood that they will agree to adopt the standard.
If compliance with the standard necessitates making significant fixed investments at an early stage, these participants may be "locked in" to the standard. In other words, firms may object to paying royalties that are higher than they contemplated but choose to do so because the alternative would require making additional fixed investments that are even more costly. Understanding this, the owner of the intellectual property may insist on higher royalties. This is the basis for a potential "hold-up" problem (see, e.g., Williamson 1985 , Hart 1995 , Shapiro 2006 , Lemley and Shapiro 2007 . Indeed, the risk of a potential hold-up may dissuade participants from adopting the standard in the first place. That is why SSOs work hard to mitigate such risks.
The potential for strategic use of intellectual property is arguably one of the most challenging problems confronted by SSOs. This risk was described in academic papers decades ago, but a number of concrete examples have recently materialized (Iversen 1999) . 18 In the U.S. this strategy is facilitated by the use of continuations, which offer applicants a good deal of flexibility to amend their claims as the parameters of a proposed standard become more clear (Lemley 2007) . The USPTO recently proposed a rule to limit continuations.
These include disputes arising from the GSM standard (Blind et al. 2002) , recipes for clean burning gasoline (Mueller 2002) , PC architecture (Shapiro 2001) , and standards for computer memory chips, digital images, and standards for HTML specifications (Chiao et al. 2006 , Soininen, 2007 .
The economic theory suggests that the ability to avoid hold-ups in standard setting hinges on the disclosure and licensing policies adopted by SSOs (Shapiro 2001 , Lemley 2002 , and Chiao et al 2006 . In the appendix we present a simple model of a monopoly SSO that summarizes the main results from the literature that are important for the case of SEPA.
In this model, the SSO has two margins it can influence. The first is the "quality" of the standard in the sense that a better standard will attract more users and hence generate larger network effects. These are the rents the SSO can use to induce users and IP owners to participate. The second margin is the terms by which essential intellectual property is obtained from its owners. The model also takes into account the relative bargaining power of the relevant constituents-users of the standard and the IP owners who provide at least some of the technology that makes the standard attractive in the first place.
Analysis of the model shows that, all else equal, an SSO where users of the standard (rather than owners of the relevant technology) have relatively more bargaining power will choose lower royalty rates and more open (e.g., non-discriminatory) licensing terms. But
SSOs generally seek to establish standards of the highest quality, in other words, ones that contribute to products and services that consumers really value. In that case, the SSO will be able to offer better terms to IP holders, since the large network effects will attract many users despite the higher prices implied by higher royalties. Indeed, if the high quality of the standard results from the contribution of high-value intellectual property, the SSO may have an incentive to offer attractive terms in order to obtain it Chiao et al. (2006) also study disclosure policies adopted by SSOs. In practice, a disclosure policy means that SSOs can require their participants to notify others of the intellectual property that is relevant to a given standardization effort. This may conflict with the interests of intellectual property owners and so it can be difficult to form a consensus in favor of a strong disclosure policy. In addition, SSOs have no legal force against third parties who are not participants in the standard-setting process. But this raises a related problem that SSOs encounter: the success of a standard depends on the ability to attract broad participation by parties who own technologies relevant to the standard. The disclosure and licensing policies of the SSO are likely to influence the willingness of these stakeholders to participate.
Outright hold-ups are less common than disputes over the terms of licensing intellectual property relevant to a standard. Often SSOs require patents to be licensed under fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms ("FRAND or RAND terms"). In other words, SSOs usually seek a system of cross-licenses or royalty payments that are not too costly for users of the standards and which apply equally to all potential users. SSOs typically eschew exclusive licenses, which might limit the number of potential users according to the terms specified by the patent owners. To the extent that an SSO is successful in obtaining licenses on RAND terms, the result is a standard that is more "open," since ownership of the underlying technology is not a precondition for participating in the standard.
But contracts in the standard-setting environment are almost inherently incomplete.
Views on what constitutes RAND terms can vary substantially. Furthermore, the enforceability of such terms can prove to be difficult: who can file a complaint and under what regulations? Against whom should the complaint be filed if the patent has been assigned to a new owner who has not participated in the standard setting? Nevertheless, the scope for disagreements is likely to be smaller if the SSO has a well-crafted policy on intellectual property.
Even where an SSO has no intellectual property policy, other law and regulation may constrain strategic use of intellectual property in standard setting. For example, the U.S.
patent law recognizes the doctrine of estoppel and the doctrine of laches, which aim at punishing a patent holder who delayed enforcing her patent (Carpentier 2006) . The doctrine of "implied license" in turn covers situations when a firm discloses its patent portfolio but then fails to comply with the restrictions on licensing with which it had concurred (Lemley 2002) . In a recent decision, two patents owned by Qualcomm were found unenforceable due to waiver when a jury determined that the company had participated in the JVT standardsetting body without disclosing the pending patents.
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In the U.S., claims under antitrust law have usually been unsuccessful in cases involving allegations of patent hold-ups in standardization (Mueller 2002 26 COMP/C-3/37.792 (2004) likely to rely on patented technology owned by a number of financial institutions and quite likely firms located outside the industry.
A successful standard-setting process is a careful balancing act, coordinating both users and producers of the relevant technology. The intellectual property policy of an SSO typically requires the disclosure of any patents on technologies proposed for adoption in the standard and may also specify the licensing terms to be used by participants. These terms should be sufficiently generous to owners of the technology to induce them to disclose their patents and, quite often, to agree to licensing them on non-discriminatory terms. They should also be adequate to reward firms for their risky investments in R&D. On the other hand, excessively high royalty payments or other licensing restrictions may discourage potential users of the technology from adopting the standard.
While standard setting can significantly increase the size and value of a market, it can also create opportunities for hold-up problems. This can occur when adopting a standard entails significant irreversible investments by participants, which essentially locks them into a particular set of technologies. An opportunistic owner of a patented technology included in the standard may be able to exploit this lock-in effect to extract supra-normal rents from adopters of the standard. This is a difficult risk to mitigate, since most standard-setting arrangements lack the power to compel participation by technology providers or to dictate the terms of licenses on patents that were not voluntarily pledged to the standard during the deliberations.
Because of these risks, it is important that standard-setting organizations establish a consensus that enjoys the considerable good will of both users and producers and of patented technologies. Establishing a clear intellectual property policy is a necessary ingredient in building such a consensus.
The Experience of Intellectual Property Rights in Standard Setting in Network and
Financial Services Industries
The Communications Industry
Network industries, where standardization has played a pivotal role in the development of the market, include electronics, computing, and telecommunications. All of these industries require interoperability. In the field of electronics and computing, public authorities have generally refrained from de jure standardization, leaving companies and company alliances to compete in the formation of the industry standard. 27 In striking contrast, in the telecommunications industry, public authorities have actively participated in standard setting, using formal organizations. The history of the GSM standard serves as an example of the challenges posed by intellectual property rights in standard setting. Like the SEPA process, it involves European public authorities promoting a European interoperability standard for a network industry dominated by national incumbents.
In Europe, at least, a reliance on de jure standard setting in telecommunications was due in part to the industrial organization of the industry. Until recent years, the European telecommunications market was dominated by national monopolies. These incumbents had to ensure conformity and coordination across their own networks, but they had little incentive to increase the interoperability of their networks. (Cunningham 2005) . There was also a concern that strategic use of intellectual property in standard setting might impede liberalization of the market (Prins and Schiessl, 1993) .
The responsibility for the GSM standard was transferred to ETSI in 1988. By then it was clear that several patented technologies were essential for the implementation of the GSM standard. Motorola owned the largest number of these patents (Bekkers et al. 2002) .
Other patent holders indicated their willingness to license under RAND terms, but Motorola declined. It also continued to patent GSM-related technology extensively.
One plausible explanation for Motorola's different strategy was likely its experience in the U.S., where patent litigation was much more common in the industry. In contrast, Bekkers et al. (2002) describe how the European companies involved in the standardization process believed that there was a "gentleman's agreement" not to patent their contributions to the standard. A similar convention had been used successfully in the implementation of the prevailing NMT standard in the Nordic countries. Motorola also suspected that, as a U.S.
company, it would receive few contracts to produce equipment for the European market and thus expected patent licensing to become its main source of income from its GSM technology.
27 Famous examples include the video cassette recorder (VCR), the compact disk (CD-ROM), and many different aspects of the design of personal computers (Grindley 1995 all Japanese suppliers were left out of the market because the license fees for necessary patents were too high (Bekkers et al. 2002) .
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A separate dispute emerged in the mid-1990s when the company InterDigital began to assert a number of its patents after the GSM standard had already been widely adopted. In litigation in the U.S., nearly all of InterDigital's patent claims were eventually rejected on obviousness grounds and no infringement was found for the remaining ones. 30 Nevertheless, the firm had been successful in obtaining licensing income from these patents (Bekkers et al. 2006 ).
ETSI attempted to mitigate these conflicts with limited success, since it developed an intellectual property policy only after the problems had become apparent. The first draft of 31 29 It appears that these companies were at a disadvantage because they could not offer licenses to patents that Motorola found sufficeintly appealing. 30 See Motorola, Inc. v. InterDigital Technology Corp., 121 F.3d 1461 (1997 . InterDigital has been more successful in obtaining licensing revenues from other patents related to GSM technology. 31 ETSI's intellectual property right policy has been evolving since 1994 and has been subject to intense debate ever since. In 2005 the European Commission examined ETSI's new intellectual property right policy in light of competition regulations and concluded that the policy is in accordance with the regulations and underlined the importance of avoiding "patent ambushes."
There is little doubt that the GSM standard has been highly a successful one. But the success of its IP policy was, at best, qualified. ETSI's goal was to establish an open, but not a royalty-free, standard available for all parties to use. This objective was not realized, since many companies were unable to obtain a license for the essential patents. In addition, some firms were exposed to potential liability for infringement after making substantial commitments to the GSM standard. Lerner (2006) A second leading example is that of DataTreasury Corporation, which owns at least six patents related to creating, processing, and storing digital images of paper checks. Check To summarize, financial patents are now commonplace in the U.S. Some of these patents are being litigated and significant licensing revenues generated. There is some preliminary evidence that patents in this sector are relatively more prone to litigation than patents in general. The typical plaintiff is not a financial services firm, but the typical defendant is. There are already examples of litigation related to payment innovations and in particular ones that require significant coordination in order to ensure interoperability (e.g., check imaging).
Financial Services in the U.S.
Seven years after the
Setting Standards for SEPA: The Role of Intellectual Property
Since the introduction of euro banknotes and coins in 2002, citizens of the euro area have been able to make cash payments within all 13 countries from a single purse, as easily as with the previous national banknotes and coins. Yet, what is now reality for cash payments remains an aspiration for cashless payments, since these retail payment methods continue to vary from one country to another. Indeed, removing the national currencies from circulation proved to be a much easier task than establishing the legal, technical, and economic infrastructure required for a modern, efficient cross-national consumer electronic payment network.
But efforts to create a fully unified payment area for the euro countries, i.e., SEPA, Another step forward will be the approval of the Directive on Payment Services (PSD) that will, among other things, establish licensing requirements for new payment institutions (which need not be banks) and provides for certain protections for consumers.
Under the proposed PSD, these new payment institutions would enjoy certain rights of access to payment systems. 35 But those provisions do not address the question of access to the relevant intellectual property or technology.
But there are diverging views on how and when the goal of a unified (electronic) euro payment area will be achieved. Despite some progress in the preparatory work, the fruition of SEPA appears to be a long way off. In particular, there is still no harmonization of standards in cashless retail payments, which remain predominantly based on national payment schemes, and consequently, national retail payment clearing and settlement infrastructures remain segmented by country. While many national retail payment systems function efficiently, this
is not the case in cross-border retail payment systems. Improved cross-border payment systems would contribute to the process of deepening financial integration in the whole euro area. Some changes are required even in the most efficient national systems of today, since, by nature, the whole process is dynamic and forward-looking.
As made clear in Sections 2-3, we think that a crucial ingredient for the successful implementation of SEPA is policies that will assist in the management of any intellectual property essential to the interoperability standards adopted. To summarize the implications of the economic theory, we start with the observation that the EPC's members consist exclusively of banks and banks are service providers in the retail market of payment media. Also, agreeing on effective intellectual property policies in standard setting is not easy. Since compliance with an SSO's intellectual property policy is almost always voluntary, these policies must be designed in order to obtain the consent of the relevant patent owners. The design of such policies is further complicated by the possibility that patents essential to compliance with the standard may be obtained by third parties who were not participants in the standard-setting process. In any case, the GSM experience underlies the importance of designing an intellectual property policy early in the process rather than late, before the intellectual property problems become acute.
The experience of the U.S. financial services sector suggests there are risks of potential hold-up problems and litigation is not uncommon. It would be particularly disappointing if costly patent disputes retard the migration away from more costly paperbased systems and toward more efficient forms of electronic payments. It is already apparent 36 Mueller (2002) proposes that in government-mandated technology standards, entities holding patent rights in the subject matter should be required to license all users at reasonable commercial terms. Furthermore, in the case where the patent owner declines to comply, the government should exercise the principle of eminent domain, i.e., the state's right under U.S. law in certain cases to seize private property for public uses.
that the extension of patentable subject matter to financial methods has induced changes in the management of intellectual property in the U.S. financial services sector. In particular, many large firms have added IP counsel to their in-house legal staff, and they are now regularly applying for their own patents.
There are also lessons common to both examples. In each instance, patentable inventions in ICT play an important role, and this suggests that a given standard may implicate dozens or even hundreds of patents. Similarly, in each instance, a significant share of the intellectual property is owned by firms in other industries-e.g., by technology vendors serving the downstream industry. In addition, the ownership of ICT patents is cosmopolitan-licensing negotiations could involve firms headquartered around the world.
Finally, while financial instruments themselves tend to be discrete, the systems and processes that make them work typically consist of many components (software and hardware) that are the product of cumulative innovation. It can be difficult to determine the contribution of a single patented component to the total value created by these new systems. Each of these factors suggests that obtaining the mutual consent of the essential parties may be complicated and time-consuming.
It is thus rather surprising to observe that the EPC has yet to publicly articulate an intellectual property policy. 37 The EPC, the European Commission, and the European Central In our view the idea of a bank-owned and -controlled organization owning all intellectual property related to the payment schemes is not realistic, since a significant share of the relevant IP is likely to be owned by companies that are not financial institutions. 39 And while the question has not been expressly discussed in any of the SEPA material we have consulted, some documents seem to suggest that the objective is to develop a standard unencumbered by any patent royalty payments. But sending such a message to potential patent holders could be a road to disaster, since it would discourage them from disclosing relevant patents to the EPC.
The apparent lack of attention to intellectual property in the SEPA process is somewhat puzzling, especially given the European Commission's prior experience with these issues in matters involving standardization. We can think of four potential explanations for the omission, but none are convincing. The first may be that EPC assumes that SEPA relies on technologies not covered by patents. It is true that many of the technologies envisioned under SEPA are already in use. However, it would be unwise to assume this implies the technology does not enjoy at least some patent protection. Given the number of patents in the financial sector and the relevant ICT sectors, such a conclusion should only follow from a thorough analysis of the adopted technologies. It does not appear that such an analysis has been undertaken.
A second explanation is that the banks, or their associations, do not own essential intellectual property or do not think they will own such an intellectual property in the future. 40 But, if this were the case, it would be in the EPC's interest to make an explicit and strict intellectual property policy obligating extensive disclosures and free or RAND licenses for the relevant patents, perhaps after inviting major technology manufacturers to participate in the standard setting.
The third explanation is that the EPC has an intellectual property policy but it is not public. If this were the case, the EPC could plan to have a tough intellectual property policy toward patent holders but is not willing to announce it at this stage when political deliberations about SEPA are ongoing. An announcement now could induce an outcry from the public and technology manufacturers calling for a more lenient intellectual property policy.
Finally, it is possible that the issue of intellectual property policy has simply been neglected. Given that patenting in the European financial services industry is a relatively new phenomenon, it is possible that the intellectual property policy design has not been a priority of the EPC or the public authorities. This also seems implausible, but nonetheless, it is our preferred explanation.
The ultimate explanation for the absence of an intellectual property policy does not matter, however. The fact that there is no public intellectual property policy is worrying in 39 It is possible that this is merely a reference to ownership of trademarks and not other intellectual property. But this point is not elaborated in other EPC documentation.
light of the examples from the previous section. It is possible that before or after SEPA enters into force, a party will emerge claiming to own an essential intellectual property to an interoperability standard that is a part of SEPA.
Although the design of an intellectual property policy for the EPC is beyond the scope of this study, we briefly summarize the key lessons from economic theory and empirical evidence from other network industries. The ultimate challenge of an SSO is to create a policy that simultaneously encourages innovation, disclosure of relevant patents, and participation in the standard setting while ensuring access to the relevant intellectual property under acceptable terms, usually RAND terms. To reach this objective, SSOs should implement policies that would encourage disclosure of relevant intellectual property and participation in the standard setting. This is achieved through guaranteeing a reasonable remuneration for the patents and participation through attractive licensing schemes or other licensing practices. It appears that the EPC's approach has been to the contrary: the EPC documentation suggests a royalty-free standard owned by the EPC-established entity. No wonder patent holders have not lined up for the standard-setting process.
Conclusion
In this article we make three points. First, we argue that innovations related to financial services and payment media can be patented in Europe, although not as easily as in the U.S. and other countries. Second, we review the law and economics literature and the actual experience of the telecommunications and the U.S. financial services industries. This examination suggests that a well-designed intellectual property policy is critical for successful standard setting in network industries such as payment media. Finally, we review the intellectual property policy of the EPC, SEPA's standard-setting body. To our surprise, we find that they have none.
While it is difficult to imagine a convincing reason for the absence of the intellectual property concerns in the SEPA project, one explanation might be that the European incumbents and policymakers in the financial services sector are relatively inexperienced in intellectual property management. Such a situation prevailed in the GSM standardization process in the communications industry. The GSM experience taught the European Commission and the European communications business and public authorities a lesson about the relevance of intellectual property management. We hope history does not repeat itself in the SEPA project. 
Appendix. A Model of a Monopoly SSO
To summarize some of the main results from the literature that have implications for the case of SEPA, we consider a simple model of a monopoly SSO. Let us denote the quality of the standard by q and the SSO's intellectual property policy by α. The higher α is, the tougher is the intellectual property policy toward the parties that do not own essential intellectual property, such as service providers, users, and consumers. For example, a high α means that the price for a license is higher or that licensing contracts include more restrictions.
Obviously, tougher intellectual property policy means that there will be less demand for the standard. The quality of the standard affects both users and intellectual property holders positively. More formally, denoting the users' gross utility by ( ) , it is natural to think that u α <0, u q >0, and π q >0, where subscripts denote the partial derivatives with respect to α and q. We may further think that π α (0,q)>0 but that π α <0 for some α sufficiently high (so that π αα <0). In other words, the intellectual property holders' profits are initially increasing in the toughness of the SSO's intellectual property policy, but since a tough IP policy restricts the use of the standard, an overly tough intellectual property policy will be harmful from the intellectual property holder's point of view. The sign follows from the second order condition for the interior solution, which makes the denominator negative, and from the fact that at the interior solution π α (α*,q)>0. Clearly, the more power the users have in the decision making of an SSO, the more lenient its intellectual property policy. Similarly, In other words, the higher the quality of the standard, the tougher the intellectual property policy. If the standard quality will be high, there will be demand for the standard despite a tough intellectual property policy.
